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Foreign Direct Investment by
Emerging Economy Multinationals:
Coping with the Global Crisis∗
Geraldine McAllister and Karl P. Sauvant
Introduction
Even before the onset of the global crisis, the global market for foreign
direct investment (FDI) had undergone significant changes. Foremost
amongst these changes was the increasing importance of emerging mar-
ket1 multinationals (MNEs). While outward foreign direct investment
(OFDI) from these markets is, in itself, not new, the magnitude that this
phenomenon achieved prior to the crisis and its resilience in the face
of the global crisis suggest that this is not a temporary occurrence but
rather a sign of a fundamental change that is taking place in the global
OFDI market. However, emerging markets are not homogenous: in addi-
tion to the rise in OFDI from emerging markets, the formation of new
regional groupings has led to the emergence of fresh investment pat-
terns. This chapter examines changes taking place in global FDI flows
and looks at the impact of the crisis in the context of profound struc-
tural changes; it also focuses on the response of emerging markets and
the enormous risks and challenges that lie ahead. It is vital to note that
this crisis is ongoing, and it is too early to predict the final contours it
will leave in its wake on the FDI landscape.
Changing patterns of OFDI: Beyond the global crisis
Changing patterns of OFDI
The rise of global OFDI over the past three decades has been remark-
able. Prior to the crisis, global OFDI flows had grown by a factor of
∗This text builds on Sauvant et al. (2010).
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Developing economies share Developed economies share
Figure 2.1 FDI outflows, globally and by group of economies, 1980–2010
(US$ billions)
Source: Authors, based on data from unctadstat.unctad.org.
40 in less than three decades, from a yearly average of US$47 billion in
1980–1985, to US$2.2 trillion in 2007 (Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). Since
peaking in 2007, OFDI flows have declined significantly. Nevertheless, at
US$1.2 trillion, average OFDI flows for the five-year period 2003–2007
were almost 40 per cent higher than in the period 1998–2002, when
they averaged US$860 billion.
Even more remarkable has been the rise in OFDI from emerging mar-
kets in recent years,2 and its ability to withstand the worst of the global
crisis. From less than 5 per cent of OFDI flows in 1990, emerging markets
accounted for almost 30 per cent of OFDI flows in 2010 (Figure 2.2), a
trend that showed no sign of changing in 2011 too. (UNCTAD, 2011a).
In terms of inward foreign direct investment(IFDI), the performance of
emerging markets has been equally impressive. The share of inward
investment flows rose from 17 per cent in 1990, to no less than 50
per cent each year until 2009, reflecting an average annual growth of
12 per cent since 2000 (UNCTAD, 2012b).
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Emerging markets value Emerging markets share
Figure 2.2 Emerging markets OFDI, value and share, 1980–2010 (US$ billions %)
Source: Authors, based on data from unctadstat.unctad.org.
The changing FDI landscape: Beyond the global crisis
To date, the focus has been on the immediate impact of the crisis,
as measured by the value of OFDI flows. The dramatic increase in
these flows till 2007 and their subsequent decline, however, is one
of the visible aspects of the fundamental changes that are reshaping
the global market for FDI. A number of these changes were percep-
tible prior to 2007–2008; the main impact of the crisis has been on
their rate of change. Other changes stem directly from the crisis, but
are likely to continue even when the world economy returns to robust
health.
Number of MNEs
The ongoing economic crisis has halted or even reversed years of eco-
nomic growth in many countries and slowed the rate of growth in
others. Its impact on the trend toward an increasingly integrated world
economy has been more limited, however, and, in many instances,
the domestic downturn has spurred firms to seek growth opportuni-
ties abroad. The significant increase in the number of MNEs, despite
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the recent years of economic turmoil, reflecting this trend. From about
70,000 MNEs in 2004, with about 690,000 foreign affiliates, there are
over 100,000 MNEs in existence today, with more than 890,000 foreign
affiliates (UNCTAD, 2005: xix; UNCTAD, 2011, annex table 34).
The geographical distribution of these MNEs and their foreign affili-
ates underlines the increasing integrated and competitive nature of the
world economy, requiring MNEs everywhere to develop a portfolio of
locational assets if they are to compete successfully in the global econ-
omy. In 2010, over 30,000 parent corporations were based in emerging
markets, a whole 30 per cent of the total (UNCTAD, 2011, annex
table 34). Emerging markets were host to over 500,000 foreign affiliates
(58 per cent of the total), a 17 per cent increase on 2004 (ibid., UNCTAD,
2005: xix). Developed economies were host to more than 370,000 for-
eign affiliates (42 per cent of the total), a figure that has grown by over
50 per cent since 2004 (ibid.).
A new Triad?
The increasing importance of OFDI by emerging market MNEs is the
latest discernible pattern in global OFDI. In a global market once domi-
nated by the US and the European Union (EU), this duopoly gave way to
the Triad of the US, EU, and Japan. This Triad declined, as Japan entered
a prolonged period of economic stagnation, and is often referred to as
‘Old Triad.’ The rise in OFDI from emerging markets has contributed to
the appearance of a ‘New Triad’ consisting of the US, the EU, and emerg-
ing markets (see Figure 2.3). Yet, Figure 2.3 reveals that this New Triad’s
share of global OFDI stocks was, in fact, higher in the early 1980s, under-
lining the frequently short-lived nature of such trends. Moreover, we
may well move beyond a world of Triads. Economou and Sauvant (2011)
look to the possible emergence of a ‘multi-polar FDI world . . . in which
smaller poles coexist with the dominant members of the former Triad,’
(2011: 2). The World Bank envisions ‘a new world order with a more dif-
fuse distribution of economic power . . . the shift toward multipolarity’
(The World Bank, 2011: xi).The changing origins of OFDI is only one
part of the picture; the sectors into which OFDI flows is also undergoing
change.
Sectoral change
The sectoral composition of global OFDI stock has changed consider-
ably over recent decades and the service sector has assumed greater
importance, aided by innovation and deregulation, as well as advances
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Old Triad Share OFDI Flows New Triad Share OFDI Flows
Old Triad Share OFDI Stocks New Triad Share OFDI Stocks
BRIC Share OFDI Flows BRIC Share OFDI Stocks 
Figure 2.3 Old and New Triad, and BRICS share of global OFDI, 1980–2010 (%)
Source: Authors, based on data from unctadstat.unctad.org.
in information communications technology (ICT). In 1990, the service
sector accounted for almost half of global OFDI stock, a share that had
risen to two-thirds by 2009. Interestingly, over this period the share
of finance within the service sector remained relatively constant, at 24
per cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011, annex table 25).
Almost all of the growth recorded, occurred within business activities,
and was the result of a shift in management practices toward core activi-
ties, and technological advancements that facilitated the off shoring and
outsourcing of various business support functions. The share of the pri-
mary sector in global OFDI stock declined only slightly over this period,
from 9 per cent in 1990 to 8 per cent in 2009, as MNEs continued to
seek secure access to finite reserves of natural resources (ibid.). Manu-
facturing, however, declined significantly, from 43 per cent of global
OFDI stock in 1990, to only 24 per cent in 2009 (ibid.).
This picture is repeated across developed economies, where the share
of the primary sector fell from 9 per cent in 1990 to 8 per cent in 2009
(ibid.). The services sector rose from 48 per cent to 64 per cent over this
period, the result of increase in business services (ibid.). At the global
October 22, 2012 15:37 MAC/MARIN Page-20 9781137277466_03_cha02
20 FDI by Emerging Economy Multinationals
level, the share of manufacturing declined from 43 per cent in 1990 to
26 per cent in 2009 (ibid.).
The picture for emerging market OFDI is very different, and rather
surprising. Both the primary and manufacturing sectors shrank signifi-
cantly over the period 1990–2009, from 13 per cent to 6 per cent, and
from 36 per cent to 11 per cent, respectively (ibid.). The service sector,
which was the principal sector in 1990 accounting for 51 per cent of
total OFDI stock, was dominating the scene by 2009, accounting for 79
per cent of OFDI stock, driven by growing OFDI in business services
(ibid.). This is explained largely by significant investment in business
activities in Hong Kong and China.3,4
The dramatic impact of the financial crisis and the ongoing global
crisis continue to affect the investment choices and decisions of MNEs.
For some, the need to reduce their debt burden has forced them to dis-
pose whole divisions, creating an opportunity for others to capitalize
on. Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the financial crisis and uncer-
tainty over the shape of ongoing reform has resulted in the decline
of investment in the service sector (Figure 2.4), and, in 2010, manu-
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Figure 2.4 Sectoral distribution of FDI projects, 2009–2010 (US$ billions, %)
Source: UNCTAD (2011: 9).
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Mode of investment
Levels of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and greenfield investment,
the principal vehicles for FDI, highlight the dramatic changes taking
place in the global FDI market (Figure 2.5).
Total M&A activity peaked in 2007 at US$1 trillion, more than double
the average of the previous decade (Figure 2.6). From 2008, however, as
markets became illiquid and firms adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach to
investment, M&A activity declined sharply, to US$250 billion in 2009,
one quarter of the previous high. A gradual recovery took place in 2010,
but at US$339 billion, total M&A activity was only one-third the level
of 2007.
The decline in M&As was most pronounced in developed economies.
From a high of US$842 billion in 2007, the total value of M&As had
fallen 80 per cent, to US$161 billion by 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011, annex
table 10). Growth resumed in 2010, but at US$216 billion, the total value
of M&As undertaken by developed countries was one quarter of its 2007
high (ibid.).
Emerging markets have weathered the crisis better. From a high of
US$167 billion in 2007, the total value of M&As declined 51 per cent to
US$81 billion in 2009 (ibid.). As in developed countries, growth resumed
in 2010, and by the end of the year the total value of M&As was almost
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M&As number Greenfield FDI number
Figure 2.5 Value and number of cross-border M&As, and greenfield FDI projects,
2007–2011 (May)
Note: Data for value of greenfield FDI projects refer to estimated amounts of capital
investment.
Source: UNCTAD (2011: 11).
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Developed economies value Emerging markets value
Figure 2.6 Total M&A value by purchase region, 1990–2011 (May) (US$ billions)
Source: Authors, based on data from UNCTAD (2011, annex table 10).
In terms of M&As, the shift in activity from developed economyMNEs
to emerging market MNEs has gained momentum since the beginning
of the crisis. Emerging markets accounted for only 10 per cent of all
M&A activity in the 1990s, a share that rose to 17 per cent in the
2000s (ibid.). By 2010, one-third of all M&A activity was taken over by
emerging market MNEs (ibid.).
Greenfield investments, which was by nature slower to react to chang-
ing economic circumstances, continued to grow through 2008, and
reached a high of US$1.5 trillion, an 80 per cent increase on the average
of the previous five years (Figure 2.7) (UNCTAD, 2011, annex table 18).
They declined in 2009 and 2010, but the decline was less dramatic to
that of M&As; at US$807 billion in 2010, the levels of greenfield invest-
ments were at 55 per cent in 2008, and in line with the average for the
period 2003–2007, at US$801 billion.
The pattern of total greenfield investments since 2003 reflected also in
the levels in both developed economies and emerging markets. Devel-
oped economies’ greenfield investments peaked in 2008 at US$1 trillion,
a rise of 60 per cent on 2007, before falling back to US$569 billion in
2010, a drop of 45 per cent (UNCTAD, 2011, annex table 18). Emerging
markets’ greenfield investment rose by 58 per cent in 2008 to reach a
high of US$434 billion, and declined to 45 per cent over the next two
October 22, 2012 15:37 MAC/MARIN Page-23 9781137277466_03_cha02
Geraldine McAllister and Karl P. Sauvant 23
Developed countries Emerging markets
–
200

















Figure 2.7 Value of greenfield projects by source, 2003–2011 (May) (US$ billions)
Source: Authors, based on data from UNCTAD (2011, annex table 18).
years to US$238 billion (ibid.). Nevertheless, over the course of the past
decade, the share of emerging markets has increased gradually: From 23
per cent in 2003, it stood at 29 per cent by 2010 (ibid.).
Emerging markets: Coping with the crisis
The crisis that began in the banking and financial systems of the
US and Europe in 2007, spread rapidly and spared few economies.
Emerging markets have not escaped the crisis, but most have displayed
greater resilience than developed economies, emerging earlier from the
downturn, thereby strengthening their relative position in the global
economy. That this has occurred less than a decade after a crisis had
swept through Asia, Russia, Latin American, and Turkey, a decade that
saw these economies become more closely integrated into the global
economy, raises the question of how this group of economies has
achieved this.
Coping strategies
The term ‘emerging markets’ encompasses a large, diverse group of
economies, affected in different ways and to different degrees by the
global crisis. In this section, we will examine the impact of the global
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crisis on four key emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India, and China,
and examine how they have responded to, and coped with, it. We will
consider the state of the economy at the onset of the crisis; the impact
of the crisis on the economy and outward investment of MNEs; policy
measures adopted in response to the crisis; and their success to date.
Brazil
Brazil, the largest economy in Latin American, enjoyed strong annual
growth from 2000 to 2008, averaging 3.7 per cent, driven, in large
part, by high commodity prices and increasing exports to China
(UNCTADSTAT, 2012). Over this same period, the OFDI stock of Brazil
more than tripled from US$54 billion to US$ 156 billion (ibid.).
The global crisis touched first on Brazil’s financial markets. By the end
of 2008, the value of the stock market had halved, and the real value of
stocks depreciated as investors sought safe havens (Trading Economics,
2012). The crisis moved quickly to the broader economy. Foreign invest-
ment declined, commodity prices fell, and exports volumes declined as
growth in Brazil’s export markets, particularly its largest export market,
China, slowed.
The Brazilian Government responded quickly to the crisis. In Decem-
ber 2008, it had launched a US$20 billion stimulus package, equivalent
to 1.2 per cent of GDP, extending the Growth Acceleration Program of
2007 (Congressional Research Service, 2009: 75). The program included
investments in infrastructure, tax cuts and measures to maintain house-
hold income, intended to shore up domestic demand. It was largely
successful, and the large domestic market and stronger demand helped
mitigate the effects of the global crisis on the economy. After contract-
ing by 0.2 per cent in 2009, the economy grew by 7.5 per cent in 2010,
one of the highest annual rates of growth since 1986 (OECD, 2010: 195).
OFDI activity by Brazilian MNEs was also curtailed during the crisis,
and flows fell from US$20 billion in 2008, to minus US$10 billion in
2009, as intra-company loans were repaid, in order to shore up par-
ent companies during the height of the crisis (ECLAC, 2009; UNCTAD,
2011). Growth resumed in 2010, and at US$11.5 billion, OFDI flows
were just over half of their 2008 high (ibid.). However, the outlook
for 2011 looks less positive, with concerns that high levels of inter-
company loan repayment by foreign affiliates will result in negative
outflows once again (see UNCTAD, 2011: 60). The higher than usual
levels of intercompany-loan repayment may be the result of efforts to
shore up parent companies, or it may be one solution to limited access
to financing domestically. Unusual, as it is to see affiliates helping the
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activities of their parent companies, this underlines the importance of
OFDI to the continued success of Brazilian MNEs.
Russia
The 1980s and 1990s were a particularly turbulent period for the
Russian economy, but that appeared to change in 1999, when Russia
entered a decade of dynamic growth averaging 8 per cent per annum,
driven largely by rising energy prices and a domestic lending boom
(UNCTADSTAT). By 2007, Russia’s foreign-held debt, including inher-
ited Soviet-era debt, was paid down and the government debt to GDP
ratio was only 7 per cent (The World Bank, 2012).Total financial assets
were equivalent to only 68 per cent of GDP); there was a regular bud-
get surplus, and foreign reserves totaled US$597 billion by mid-2008
(Nanto, 2009: 96). Over this period, Russian OFDI grew dramatically,
from US$2 billion in 1999 to US$56 billion in 2008 (UNCTADSTAT).
OFDI stock rose from US$9 billion in 1999, to US$370 billion by
2007 (ibid.).
The global crisis brought this decade of growth to an abrupt end.
The fall in global demand caused commodity exports to fall and prices
to collapse—extremely damaging for an economy in which ten of the
twenty largest non-financial outward investors5 are in the oil and gas, or
metal industries (IMEMO-VCC, 2011: 2). More than half the value of the
Russian stock exchange was wiped out between July 2008 and July 2009,
as nervous investors withdrew (Financial Times, 2008: 13), and a weak
banking system and tighter credit reduced domestic demand (Filippov,
2011). From growth of 8.5 per cent in 2007, the economy shrank by
7.8 per cent in 2009 (UNCTADSTAT). Over this same period, Russian
OFDI stock also declined. Having grown 18-fold between 2000 and 2007
to a total of US$370, it fell by 44 per cent in 2008 to US$206 bil-
lion (UNCTADSTAT), reflecting a fall in the value of foreign assets, and
firms pulling back after a period of rapid expansion (Panibratov and
Kalotay, 2009). However, the downturn in 2008–2009 did not signal the
beginning of an extended period of economic decline: The economy
and OFDI both returned to growth in 2010, growing 4 per cent and 50
per cent, respectively (UNCTADSTAT).
How has Russia succeeded in coping with this global crisis, only a
decade after a more-limited crisis forced the government to devalue
its currency and default on its debt? One of the critical differences is
that this was not a crisis solely of Russia’s making and, as a result,
its economy was less directly impacted than the economies of developed
countries in whose banking systems the crisis had its roots. Strong global
October 22, 2012 15:37 MAC/MARIN Page-26 9781137277466_03_cha02
26 FDI by Emerging Economy Multinationals
growth before the crisis kept commodity prices high, allowing Russia to
accumulate almost US$600 billion in currency reserves (Nanto, 2009:
96), including US$130 billion in the Stabilization Fund of the Russian
Federation, created in 2004 (Ministry of Finance of the Russian Feder-
ation, 2012). As a result, the authorities enjoyed much greater ‘space’
in which to develop emergency policies in response to the crisis. The
IMF estimates at 10.5 per cent of GDP the loosening that occurred in
Russia’s primary balance over 2008–2009 (IMF, 2010: 29), used to shore
up the domestic economy through loans to banks, government purchase
of stocks, emergency loans to strategically important firms, and a lower-
ing of the corporate tax rate. Yet, not all efforts were successful: Attempts
to support the ruble failed, at an estimated cost of US$200 billion (IMF,
2010: 28) and, finally, it was allowed to devalue.
The crisis highlighted structural weaknesses in the Russian economy:
an over-reliance on the oil and gas and metal industry, and a weak bank-
ing sector. Yet, the government has done little to diversify economic
activity; focusing resources on a small number of state-controlled firms
further hampers private firms’ access to capital (Nanto, 2009; Filippov,
2011). Finally, the government response has been criticized for its opac-
ity (Jellinek, 2009;Wisniewska et al., 2010; Filippov, 2011) with concerns
that support went primarily to firms deemed strategically important,
while failing to develop clear policies to support OFDI by Russian MNEs.
India
The years 2000 to 2010 saw India enjoy average annual growth of 7.9
per cent, its highest decade of growth since 1970 (UNCTADSTAT), driven
largely by growing domestic demand. With the gradual liberalization
of the economy from the 1990s onward, India became more closely
integrated into the global economy through trade and capital flows, a
trend that is reflected in the rapid growth of OFDI by Indian MNEs.6
From US$1.4 billion in 2001, OFDI flows exceeded US$19 billion in
2008 (UNCTAD, 2011). In 2009, seven Indian MNEs featured among
the top-100 non-financial MNEs of emerging markets (UNCTAD, 2011,
annex table 30), in industries as diverse as metal and metal products
and consulting services. Only one of the seven firms, Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation Limited, is state-owned, reflecting the dominant role
of the private sector in Indian OFDI.
As the home-country policy framework changed, so have the pat-
terns of Indian OFDI. From an early concentration in manufacturing
and an emphasis on south–south investments prior to 1991, Indian
OFDI shifted toward investment in services, increasingly in developed
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economies (Kumar, 2007). Deregulation spurred growth in the domes-
tic economy, underlining the importance of securing access to natural
resources. Between 2000 and 2007, 25 per cent of Indian OFDI was in the
primary sector, with 40 per cent in manufacturing, and 35 per cent in
services (Pradhan, 2011b). Hand in hand with this shift, OFDI by Indian
MNEs increasingly took place through M&As in developed economies.
Between 2000 and 2009, 58 per cent of all OFDI by Indian MNEs was
in developed economies: Europe received 41 per cent of OFDI flows
and North America 10 per cent, with 21 per cent in South-Eastern Asia
(Pradhan, 2011a: 125, 127).
The greater openness of the Indian economy, with globalization act-
ing as an accelerator in good economic times, lessened its resistance
to the global crisis. From 9.6 per cent in 2007, the rate of growth of
the Indian economy almost halved to 5.1 per cent in 2008, as exports
fell and capital flows declined (UNCTADSTAT). The credit freeze limited
access to overseas borrowing, a critical source of funding for cross-
border M&As, and OFDI flows declined significantly. From a high of
US$19 billion in 2008, OFDI flows from India fell by 18 per cent, to
US$16 billion in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011).
The Government responded swiftly to the global crisis through a com-
bination of fiscal and monetary policy measures; its efforts focused on
shoring up aggregate demand and maintaining liquidity. With domes-
tic demand driving growth in the Indian economy, the downturn was
short-lived (Pradhan, 2011b). The rate of growth picked up in 2009,
reaching 7.7 per cent that year, and 8.5 per cent in 2010 (UNCTADSTAT).
Yet, as the global downturn continued with developed economies worst
affected, OFDI registered a further 8 per cent decline in 2010, falling to
US$14.6 billion (UNCTAD, 2011).
China
China is the largest emerging market and, since 2011, the world’s sec-
ond largest economy, following three decades of average annual growth
approaching 10 per cent, driven by the industrialization of the econ-
omy and its increasing openness to trade and foreign investment.
Between 2000 and 2007 alone, annual growth averaged 10.5 per cent
(UNCTADSTAT). OFDI by Chinese MNEs has also grown rapidly. From
less than US$40 million in 1981, OFDI stocks totaled US148 billion in
2008, a 54 per cent increase on 2007 (UNCTAD, 2011). OFDI flows more
than doubled from 2007 to 2008, to US$52 billion (ibid.). As a result of
its growing trade surpluses and FDI, China’s holdings of foreign reserves
have increased dramatically, totaling US$1.6 trillion (excluding gold)
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before the crisis (end 2007) and US$2.8 trillion at the end of 2010 (The
People’s Bank of China, 2008, 2010).
Despite its record of strong growth, the importance of trade and
FDI to the Chinese economy exposed it to the recession in its largest
export markets, the European Union and the US. By May 2009, exports
were less than three-quarters of their level of the previous year (Con-
gressional Research Service, 2009: 75). Inward FDI flows (IFDI), having
doubled since the beginning of the decade, fell by 12 per cent in 2009
(UNCTADSTAT). The rate of growth of OFDI flows fell rapidly, from
132 per cent in 2007–2008, to 8 per cent in 2008–2009 (ibid.), but in a
context in which world FDI flows halved. The impact on unemployment
was swift, with the government estimating that 20 million migrant
workers had lost their jobs in 2008 because of the crisis (Congressional
Research Service, 2009: 75).
The Chinese authorities acted swiftly to mitigate the effects of the
crisis on the domestic economy, launching a US$586 billion stimulus
package in November 2008, equivalent to 12 per cent of GDP (Congres-
sional Research Service, 2009: 75). The scale of the stimulus package
and the speed with which it was announced, ahead even of the US
announcement of a US$787 stimulus package in February 2009 (Recov-
ery.gov), indicated the authorities’ level of concern over the impact
of the crisis on the Chinese economy. Their aim was to maintain
aggregate demand through increased spending on infrastructure and
social welfare, and tax deductions on capital spending by firms (Nanto,
2009). Monetary policy measures were also adopted: after a period of
strengthening, the RMB was allowed to depreciate, interest rates and
reserve requirements were lowered, and lending by state banks was eased
(De Beule and Van Den Bulcke, 2010). Furthermore, the government
sought to support OFDI by Chinese firms, by simplifying the approvals
process, for example, and reducing restrictions on firms’ lending to their
affiliates (ibid.).
The measures adopted by the Chinese authorities in response to the
global crisis were largely successful, sparing the economy from its worst
effects. Growth, which had fallen from 14 per cent in 2007 to 9.2
per cent in 2009, exceeded 10 per cent in 2010 (World Bank Indicators).
The rate of growth of OFDI picked up: From 8 per cent in 2008–2009,
it reached 20 per cent in 2009–2010 (UNCTAD, 2011). By 2010, China’s
OFDI stock totaled US$298 billion, double their 2008 level (ibid.), as
Chinese firms, unhindered by the credit crisis and taking advantage
of lower asset prices, made a large number of acquisitions. Despite the
apparent success of the policies implemented in mitigating the impact
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of the crisis on the economy, concerns remain. While the measures
implemented have helped Chinese firms weather the storm in the short
term, will state-control hamper their ability to pursue policies based on
economic objectives in the longer term? (De Beule and Van Den Bulcke,
2010).
The BRIC economies
The BRIC group of economies and the OFDI activities of their MNEs
have shown great resilience in the face of the global crisis. As the
crisis hit, MNEs responded by scaling back their OFDI: From a high
of US$148 billion in 2008, OFDI flows fell by 14 per cent in 2009,
to US$126 billion (UNCTADSTAT). Nevertheless, by 2010, activity had
returned to pre-crisis levels and the combined OFDI flows from the BRIC
economies totaled US$146 billion, 99 per cent of their record 2008 level
(ibid.). In 2010, they accounted for 11 per cent of global OFDI flows, a
dramatic increase on their 1 per cent share in 2000 (ibid.). For the first
time, the combined OFDI stock of the BRIC group exceeded US$1 trillion
in 2010, 5 per cent of the global OFDI stock (ibid.). This represented an
almost tenfold increase on 2000, when their OFDI stock totaled slightly
more than US$100 billion (ibid.).
There are a number of reasons for the resilience of these emerg-
ing markets and the OFDI activities of their MNEs in the face of the
worst global crisis since the 1930s. The global crisis began in the finan-
cial markets of developed economies, where more than two decades of
deregulation had reduced considerably levels of oversight and control at
a time of great innovation in financial products. This was not the case
in emerging markets, where the harsh lessons learned from the emerg-
ing markets crisis of the 1990s were still fresh. Governments in these
economies have maintained a much greater role in the operation and
supervision of financial markets. In addition, total levels of debt, espe-
cially foreign currency denominated debt, were low, and sustained bud-
get surpluses combined with high levels of FDI, enabled governments
to accumulate significant foreign currency reserves. Despite some initial
weakening, therefore, emerging market currencies generally remained
strong, limiting the impact of the crisis on the domestic economy.
High levels of growth in emerging markets are often attributed to the
important role of exports in their economies. Exports are indeed impor-
tant but their relative importance is declining. Instead, it is their strong
domestic demand, with high levels of consumption and investment that
has supported high growth rates in most emerging markets, and insu-
lated them from the worst of the crisis. High savings rates and bank
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deposits have supported domestic lending; critically, bank lending did
not decline at the onset of the crisis. The authorities did not raise inter-
est rates, and in a number of economies, including India, interest rates
were lowered.
Emerging markets have benefited from the dominance of FDI in their
private capital flows, generally considered a more stable form of cap-
ital than portfolio investment or other forms of debt finance such as
loans and bonds. However, even FDI is not quite as stable a form of cap-
ital as it once was considered to be, as its composition also shifts from
mainly equity to debt in the form of intra-company loans. The risks
associated with this are seen in the OFDI from Brazil, which is expected
to decline or become negative in 2011, the result of higher than usual
levels of intra-company loan repayment (UNCTAD, 2011: 60). There
are a number of possible explanations for this: Weaker performance in
the home market may have reduced profitability, or access to capital
may have become more limited; but the fact that foreign affiliates are
shoring up their parent companies further underlines the importance
of OFDI.
OFDI by emerging market MNEs has taken the form of greenfield
investment for the most part, while developed country MNEs have
relied more on M&As. The latter are more vulnerable to shocks to the
financial system and, as liquidity and funding dried up, the number
of M&As undertaken by developed economy MNEs fell rapidly. Emerg-
ing market MNEs, especially relatively young firms, have not enjoyed
the same access to international capital markets, and they and their
OFDI activities consequently suffered less. In those instances in which
emerging market MNEs do engage in cross-border M&As, they are more
likely to pay for them in cash rather than in shares (World Bank, 2011:
83–84), a decision linked to the ownership nature of these firms and the
limitations of their domestic capital markets. Emerging market firms are
more likely to be family or state-controlled entities that seek to avoid
any dilution of their control, and so prefer to pay for acquisitions in
cash (ibid., Resende et al., 2010).
Finally, the strong performance of emerging markets and their MNEs
highlights how critical it is to maintain strong economic fundamen-
tals. Thanks to their sound economic management pre-crisis, with
large foreign exchange reserves and low levels of national debt, these
governments had the necessary ‘policy space’ to implement emer-
gency measures to shore up their economies during turbulent economic
times.
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Global players from emerging economies: challenges ahead
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the attentions of key actors
were focused on responding to its most pressing challenges and, to
date, these efforts have proven relatively successful. By the end of 2010,
OFDI flows from emerging market MNEs had reached a new high of
US$388 billion (UNCTADSTAT). Inward investment to emerging mar-
kets has also made a strong recovery, reaching US$753 billion in 2011,
97 per cent of its 2008 high (UNCTAD, 2012). However, numerous other
challenges persist, some inherent in the rise of these new global play-
ers, others resulting from the ongoing economic crisis. This section
addresses a number of these risks and challenges, and considers the path
ahead.
Key strategic challenges for emerging market MNEs
Perhaps the single most important challenge that emerging market
MNEs face relates to their human resources. Building a successful, inte-
grated international production network is a formidable challenge, to
do so through the successful integration of acquired firms amplifies the
difficulties. It places considerable demands on their human resources,
in particular on their managerial skills and capacity. Moreover, the scale
of the challenge is relatively higher for emerging market MNEs: Inter-
nationalizing often at an early stage in their development (and more
recently), they have had less time to develop such skills and capacities.
Those emerging markets that have a longer and greater experience with
OFDI have distinct advantages in this area, having been able to develop
management skills, expertise, and an understanding of international
markets (Jaklicˇ and Svetlicˇicˇ, 2010).
Emerging markets MNEs that have undertaken OFDI more recently
are less likely to have built up expertise and capacity in integrating
acquisitions and managing foreign affiliates, a gap that may be fur-
ther compounded by an unwillingness to hire non-national managers.
An example is Brazil, where the level of foreign managerial employment
among leading MNEs is almost half that of the 100 largest develop-
ing country MNEs (Resende et al., 2010: 104). Family-controlled MNEs
seek to avoid any dilution of their control and high levels of ‘in-group
collectivism’ (ibid.), and such practices complicate further the build-
ing of international management networks and do not bode well for
the ability of those MNEs to create integrated international production
networks.
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There are also broader challenges to be met. MNEs face the continuous
challenge of balancing opportunities and risks. The rapid pace of global-
ization and industry consolidation has led in many cases to a mind-set
of ‘hunt or be hunted’ (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2007: 5). One illustra-
tive industry in this respect is mining, where record commodity prices
facilitated the paying down of debt incurred to pursue acquisitions.
Industry players saw consolidation as essential to achieving economies
of scale and synergies in operations. Today, however, the dominance
of resource-based firms in the OFDI of a number of emerging markets
brings its own set of challenges (Kalotay, 2010). Natural-resource-based
firms account for four-fifths of the foreign assets of the top 25 Russian
MNEs, for example (ibid.). Their rapid expansion took place on the back
of high commodity prices. While commodity prices have recovered,
high levels of debt make for an uncertain future, in which divestiture
and further industry consolidation may be the only options available.
Sustainable FDI is another area that presents potential challenges
for emerging market MNEs, looking at the importance of FDI along
four dimensions: ‘economic development, environmental sustainabil-
ity, social development, good governance’ (VCC-WAIPA, 2010: 4) rather
than in dollar and employment terms. Just as emerging markets become
important players in global FDI markets, the scale against which impor-
tance is measured is shifting from quantity to quality (Filippov and
Guimón, 2009). This represents a challenge for all MNEs—but the scale
of the challenge is perhaps greater for emerging market MNEs. In the
case of these MNEs, importance to the domestic economy is still mea-
sured in terms of dollars and employment created. In addition, emerging
market MNEs are important investors in natural resources, a sector in
which until recently the focus has been on short-term contributions
measured in dollar terms. The ability of emerging market MNEs to
adapt to these new standards is critical to their continued growth and
success—and may ultimately have spillover effects in the home country,
leading, in the longer term, to a harmonization of standards upwards.
Challenges for home country policies
Today, while the landscape of home country OFDI policies is very
uneven, the vast majority of emerging markets do not provide a sup-
portive environment for the OFDI activities of their firms, placing them
at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their developed country coun-
terparts. The principal challenge for home country policy in emerging
markets is, within the constraints of limited resources and widespread
needs, to create an environment and policy framework that supports
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domestic firms. This framework should enhance their competitiveness,
enable them to compete effectively in the global arena and, ultimately,
secure the benefits of OFDI for their home countries. Certainly, the
substantial rise in outward investment from emerging markets is a rela-
tively new phenomenon, and national policy is not written or rewritten
overnight. On the one hand, if emerging market firms are disadvan-
taged by a continued lack of supportive policies, and thus are hampered
in their competition on the world market, they may, in extreme cases,
shift their base to another country in order to stay competitive. On the
other hand, the scope of government action and policy-making is con-
strained by economic reality—limited resources, scarce foreign reserves,
and potential concerns over the export of capital and jobs.
The lack of a supportive policy framework in many emerging markets7
stands in contrast to developed countries, which have built an extensive
and comprehensive policy framework over decades, policies that have
evolved in tandem with, and complement, their economic situation.
The result has been a gradual but persistent shift in home country pol-
icy from restricting and controlling OFDI, to permitting it, and finally
to promoting OFDI actively, reflecting the recognition that, in a global
market, firms must be globally competitive, with OFDI being one source
of such competitiveness.
The experience of developed countries in building a policy frame-
work for OFDI offers lessons for policy-makers in emerging markets.
In the aftermath of World War II, early restrictions on OFDI focused
on capital and foreign exchange controls. Gradually phased out by the
early 1980s, these controls were eliminated, finally, as a global capital
market became a reality. From restrictions on OFDI, developed coun-
tries adapted policies to shape and, ultimately, promote OFDI8 (Buckley
et al., 2010). However, even with a detailed understanding of the policies
implemented in developed countries, challenges remain for emerging
markets. While the lack of a clear policy framework leaves domes-
tic firms at a competitive disadvantage, changing the situation is not
without its own challenges, given the lack of domestic experience and
competence in this area, the risks of regulatory capture, and the absence
of a significant social safety net (ibid.).
Coming through the crisis with their relative position in the global
economy strengthened has done little to reduce the policy dilemma
facing emerging markets. The need for firms to acquire a portfolio of
locational assets in order to retain and maximize their competitiveness
in a global setting must be balanced against the broad macroeconomic
interests of home country needs. Concerns over the export of jobs are as
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relevant in emerging markets as in developed economies (Broadman,
2010). Where national champions or state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
from emerging markets undertake FDI, this poses potential political
challenges for the home country as much as for the host country. Whilst
a relatively small share of total OFDI in most emerging markets, as
SOEs move abroad and ‘grow up,’ they may well seek greater indepen-
dence in determining their own economic future, free from political
constraints (ibid.). Furthermore, critics argue that SOEs crowd out more
efficient private companies in markets for financial and human capital
(The Economist, 2012: 11). How do home country policy-makers retain
control, without hindering the competitiveness of their SOE-MNE? This
question remains unanswered; but to hope that as they mature and
expand, SOEs will simply throw of their political shackles is unrealistic.
Information on the experiences of developed countries and the dif-
ferent policy options available is useful for emerging markets, but how
applicable is it? Furthermore, even with this information, the challenge
of sequencing shifts in policy remains. The fact that emerging mar-
ket MNEs may be ‘born global,’ or may skip stages of development
and internationalization does nothing to lessen the complexity of the
policy makers’ task (De Beule and Van Den Bulcke, 2010). Rapid glob-
alization and the early internationalization of emerging market MNEs
render redundant some of the policy lessons from developed countries.
It is more likely that emerging markets will instead combine elements
of policy from different stages of development—the selective promotion
of OFDI, for example, with retaining elements of control (ibid.).
China is an example of how one particularly important emerging
market has addressed the challenges for home country policy and,
in particular, the shift from OFDI restriction to promotion. China’s
OFDI policy evolved in three phases from 1984 to 2008 (Xue and Han,
2010). Adopted largely out of economic necessity in 1984, early policy
involved strict controls on OFDI. By 1991, the domestic policy envi-
ronment had liberalized gradually, and OFDI’s role in economic growth
was endorsed. From 1991, OFDI policy focused on large SOEs until, in
2000, funds were established to encourage the internationalization of
small and medium-sized firms. The year 2000 also saw the unveiling of
China’s ‘Going Global’ policy and the differentiation of OFDI policies
into policies of regulation, guidance and support (ibid.). China offers a
particularly interesting example: It embraced ‘Open-Door’ policies only
three decades ago but, in a relatively short period, OFDI flows have
grown considerably, from only US$44 million in 1982 to US$68 billion
in 2010 (UNCTADSTAT). Furthermore, the continued and prominent
role of SOEs in the Chinese economy and the country’s OFDI allows
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the government a degree of direct influence, impossible for most other
national policy-makers.
Challenges for host country policies
In spite of the global economic turmoil, the investment climate for
FDI remains overwhelmingly welcoming, and virtually all countries seek
to attract inward investment (Figure 2.9). While a certain number of
restrictive and adverse measures have been introduced even before the
onset of the global crisis, they should be considered in the context of
an investment environment that is already largely open. Furthermore,
the vast majority of the regulatory measures introduced were limited
to specific sectors, including land ownership and investment in natural
resources (Economou and Sauvant, 2012), particularly sensitive sectors
even in the best of economic times. The OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness
Index for 2010, measuring the restrictiveness of FDI policies across 48




























































































Figure 2.8 OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index, 2010
Source: Authors, based on OECD (2010).
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Figure 2.9 National regulatory measures, 1992–2010 (%)
all major economies are rated below 0.46, and most are rated below 0.15
(OECD, 2010).
Yet, a distinct trend toward a more restrictive investment climate has
emerged over the past decade (Figures 2.9 and 2.10) and, in 2010, one-
third of all national regulatory measures imposed greater regulation or
restrictions on FDI.9
In a regulatory environment that has become more restrictive, the
rise of outward investment from emerging markets presents its own
set of challenges for host country policies, particularly for developed
host countries. As noted above, investment by emerging market MNEs
in developed economies generally takes the form of acquisitions, often
considered less attractive by the host country because of the limited con-
tribution to increased economic output. That the firms being acquired
may be deemed part of a ‘strategic sector,’ raises further concerns over
national security. When the acquiring firm is a state-owned enterprise
or a sovereign wealth fund, this only amplifies host country concerns.
In the US, the share of inward investment notices that progressed to
investigations rose from 15 per cent in 2008 to 38 per cent in both 2009
and 2010 (Table 2.2) (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, 2011: 3).
The rapid rise in OFDI from China in the past decade and the dom-
inant role played by SOEs in this outward investment represents a par-
ticular challenge to host country policy for the US (Sauvant, 2010a,b).
























































Number of countries that introduced changes
Figure 2.10 National regulatory measures, 1992–2010
Source: The authors, based on UNCTAD 2008 (13) and UNCTAD (2011) (94).
















2008 155 18 23 5 0
2009 65 5 25 2 0
2010 93 6 35 6 0
Total 313 29 83 13 0
Source: Based on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Annual Report
to Congress (2011: 3).
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By the end of 2010, China had invested almost US$298 billion abroad,
a near ten-fold increase since 20000 (UNCTADSTAT). China is the US
government’s largest creditor: It holds US$1.6 trillion of US securities
and foreign exchange reserves of US$3.2 trillion (Morrison and Labonte,
2011: i). The fact that the vehicle of choice for most of this OFDI has
been mergers and acquisitions only exacerbates tensions. Policy in the
US has become more cautious in recent years, especially with regard to
Chinese firms. National security concerns play a more important role
in shaping this policy, fed by fears that Chinese investment decisions
are driven as much (if not more) by strategic and political motivations
rather than by economic motivations. This situation is not completely
new, however: Japanese investment once stirred up similar fears, which
were successfully allayed when Japanese firms worked closely with the
different stakeholders in order to become ‘insiders’ (ibid., Milhaupt,
2010).
Host country apprehension—founded or not—that certain acquisi-
tions are driven by political rather than commercial objectives will do
nothing to reduce restrictions on FDI. Unchecked, this could evolve into
FDI protectionism, inflicting damage on the recovery, continued inte-
gration, and smooth functioning of the global economy. Protectionism
on the part of developed countries, traditionally the main proponents
of liberalization, in response to the emergence of new players would
border on hypocrisy, and would deprive host (developed) economies of
the widely recognized benefits of FDI. Restricting the access of these
new players to developed markets would deny their firms vital access to
new skills, technologies, and markets, preventing them from building
the portfolio of locational assets so essential to their global competitive-
ness. Ultimately, opportunities for both growth and development, for
the firm, home and host economy, would be lost.
The path ahead
Two decades ago, outward investment from emerging markets
accounted for less than 8 per cent of the world’s outward investment
stock (UNCTADSTAT). The Soviet Union had only recently reintroduced
the right of private ownership in an attempt to stimulate its economy.
Fifteen years ago, the Asian financial crisis devastated economies across
the region and beyond. Today, as global players from emerging markets
move toward the center of the world stage, the world is in the grip of the
worst economic crisis since the 1930s, a crisis that broke over four years
ago and that shows little sign of ending in a number of countries. Look-
ing ahead, what are the main challenges facing FDI and the main actors
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in this process? Will the current economic downturn require them sim-
ply to ride out this crisis, with normal business resuming as soon as
possible? Alternatively, will the combination of the rise of global players
from emerging markets and the global crisis require the rules of FDI to
be rewritten?
Perhaps the single most important challenge that emerging mar-
ket MNEs face relates to their ability to address the heightened levels
of political risks resulting from the ongoing global crisis. The relative
youth of many emerging market MNEs serves to increase the scale
of the challenge. Broadly defined as ‘the probability of disruption of
the operations of companies by political forces and events’ (MIGA,
2011: 21), until recently, the challenges presented by political risk have
been viewed largely in the context of MNEs from developed coun-
tries investing in emerging markets. The global crisis has shattered this
assumption.
It is important to recognize that, having developed in riskier polit-
ical and economic environments, emerging market MNEs’ notions of
risk can be very different from those of developed countries’ MNEs.
Generally, the greater the levels of political risk in the home coun-
try, the greater the tolerance for risk that MNEs develop (MIGA, 2010).
Location, sector, size of investment, and home country environment
and earlier experience with outward investment all shape their percep-
tion of political risk (ibid.). Interestingly, in terms of entry mode, while
greenfield investments are considered economically more desirable and
less politically risky in developed countries, emerging market MNEs con-
sider them more risky in other emerging markets where ‘the presence
of a domestic partner tends to reduce risk perceptions’ (MIGA, 2010:
228). Fortunately, governments—alone or in conjunction with the pri-
vate sector—have the ability to minimize the impact of political risk on
investment decisions through the provision of insurance, a policy tool
that should become an increasingly important element of home country
policy in emerging markets.
However, since the onset of the global crisis, emerging market
MNEs are most concerned by changes in the regulatory framework
(Figure 2.11) and more concerned about such changes to the investment
climate than they are about the state of the global economy and access
to financing (MIGA, 2011). In particular, it is ‘the instability of the regu-
latory regime . . . rather than the regime itself’ that concerns investors
(MIGA, 2011: 22). The dramatic growth and strong performance of
emerging markets and their MNEs mitigated the scale of the global
downturn. The recovery of the global economy is patchy and remains
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Figure 2.11 Types of political risk of most concern to investors in developing
countries (% respondents)
Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey, reproduced in MIGA (2011) World Investment and
Political Risk Report, 20.
fragile. It is vital that efforts are made to keep the global economy open
to outward investments from emerging markets.
The financial crisis and subsequent government rescue programs have
increased previously high public debt to unsustainable levels in several
developed economies—in excess of 100 per cent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in Ireland, Portugal, Greece, and Italy (Eurostat, 2012). Not
since the 1930s has a Western European country defaulted on its debt,
but there is real concern today that, orderly or disorderly, Greece can-
not avoid a sovereign default. Greece’s creditors are at immediate risk,
and investors are wary of an economy that is in its fifth year of con-
traction. The greatest risk, however, is that this sovereign debt crisis
will spread beyond Greece to other highly in debt Eurozone economies:
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and (of most concern given the size of its econ-
omy) Italy. The potentially disastrous consequences for the European
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economy should fears of contagion become reality, make this one of
the most pressing risks of the day. Moreover, the EU is a key pillar of
the global economy, a vital source of, and destination for FDI, with the
Euro a global reserve currency that accounts for close to 27 per cent
of the world’s currency reserves (The Economist, 2011). Whatever hap-
pens within the Eurozone and the European Union, therefore, will have
dramatic implications for the global economy and FDI. Rising levels of
civil unrest hinder the economic reform efforts of national governments
and raise concerns about the stability and predictability of future poli-
cies. The crisis in Greece has laid bare the slow and unwieldy nature of
EU policy-making and, more worryingly, the divisions that exist among
member nations, exacerbated in these tough economic times. Further
uncertainty in this region could well tip the global economy back into
recession.
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to place the rise of emerging market MNEs
in context, examining the role of these new global players in global
FDI flows, how they have responded to the global crisis, and the chal-
lenges inherent in their rise for MNEs themselves as well as for home and
host countries. Whatever the tensions and temporary setbacks, the great
number of firms undertaking FDI will build an ever more interconnected
and integrated international production system.
All this, finally, needs to be seen against one basic fact: Countries do
not look at FDI as an end in itself. Rather, it is seen as a tool to advance
their development, be it as a home country or host country. As part of
that, FDI is a powerful means to help countries in their integration into
the world economy. In addition, economic development through inte-
gration into the world economy is one of the means by which countries
lift themselves out of poverty. Despite the global crisis, much progress
has been made in recent years, yet much remains to be done—and the
greater the number of firms involved in this process the better it is for
all of us.
Finally, efforts to build a multilateral investment framework must be
stepped up. The need to address and allay concerns that feed growing
economic nationalism and FDI protectionism is not limited to MNEs,
home and host country governments: This situation highlights the
important role that international organizations must play if the inter-
national investment regime is to remain relatively open, transparent,
and stable. An international framework, establishing best practices and
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minimum standards, and bringing greater transparency to the now truly
international investment regime are to the benefit of all.
Notes
1. According to UNCTAD terminology, the group of ‘developed economies’ com-
prises the 27 Member States of the European Union, plus Australia, Bermuda,
Canada, Gibraltar, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,
and the US. ‘Emerging markets’ comprise both ‘developing countries’ and
‘transition economies.’ The ‘transition economies’ group consists of the six
countries of Southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
The FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) as well as the twelve coun-
tries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, Russian
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. All other
countries are ‘developing countries’.
2. For a full discussion, see Sauvant et al. (2010); Sauvant (2010); Ramamurti and
Singh (2009); Ramamurti (2008); Sauvant et al. (2008).
3. See UNCTAD (2011, annex table 25), note a.
4. UNCTAD (2011, annex table 25) Notes states that ‘Data should be interpreted
with caution. The world total was extrapolated on the basis of data cover-
ing 29 countries in 1990 and 54 countries in 2009, or latest year available.
They account for 82 and 89 per cent of world outward FDI stock, respec-
tively, in 1990 and in 2009. Only countries for which data for the three
main sectors were available were included. The distribution shares of indus-
tries of these countries were applied to estimate the world totals of sectors and
industries. As a result, the sum of the sectors for each group of economies
is different from the totals shown in annex table 2. Approval data were
used for India (2005 instead of 2007) and Taiwan Province of China. For
1990, the world total includes the countries of South-East Europe and the
CIS although data by sector and industry are not available for that region.
Moreover, as major home developing economies were not covered due to
lack of data, the respective shares for developing economies were underes-
timated in that year,’) http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR11_
web%20tab%2025.pdf, last visited March 9, 2011).
5. Measured by foreign assets.
6. For a discussion of the rise of Indian MNEs, see Sauvant et al. (2010).
7. The term ‘emerging markets,’ the grouping together of developing countries
and transition economies, risks giving the impression, falsely, of a homoge-
nous group of countries. It should also remind us of the limitations inherent
in any attempt to construct one policy framework that fits all emerging mar-
kets. The key to successful policy is to ensure that it is appropriate to the stage
of development of the national economy.
8. The authors group these measures into seven categories: ‘(i) the provision of
information and technical support, (ii) financial support, (iii) fiscal incen-
tives, (iv) investment insurance and guaranteed, (v) support of national
champions, (vi) international investment related concordats and agreements,
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and (vii) official development assistance (ODA) programs’ (Buckley et al.,
2010: 259).
9. Available data for 2011 (January–September 15), appear to show a slight shift
toward a more relaxed investment climate, with almost three-quarters of all
the measures adopted liberalizing or promoting FDI, but it is perhaps too soon
to draw any definitive conclusions.
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